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Corporate Opacity and Cost of Debt for Family Firms

Abstract:

This paper uses a sample of Chinese firms to examine the impact of corporate opacity
on the relationship between family control and firms’ cost of debt. We find that family
control is associated with a lower cost of debt on average, and a negative impact exists
mainly in firms with relatively low corporate opacity. We further provide evidence that the
moderating effect of corporate opacity becomes more pronounced when investors’ perception
of controlling families’ moral hazard of expropriation is higher. Our results are robust to
alternative opacity proxies and controlling for endogeneity of family control using the
instrumental variable method. Our study highlights that controlling families are
heterogeneous in their impact on the shareholder–debtholder relationship in family firms, and
debtholders view corporate opacity as an important reference in assessing the extent of
potential agency conflicts in China.
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Corporate Opacity and Cost of Debt for Family Firms

1. Introduction
In recent years a small but growing body of literature (e.g., Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb,
2003; Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010; Ellul, Guntay, & Lel, 2007; Lin, Ma, Malatesta, & Xuan,
2011) has explored the impact of family ownership on the shareholder–debtholder agency
cost of debt. In this paper, we focus on one firm-level factor that is well-known to be
associated with agency conflicts and yet largely ignored in the examination of the impact of
family ownership on the cost of debt. This particular factor is corporate information opacity,
which plays a critical role in determining the extent of agency conflicts between shareholders,
managers, and creditors and in designing the mechanisms to mitigate these conflicts
(Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004; Bushman & Smith, 2001; Jensen & Meckling, 1976;
Smith & Warner, 1979).
Controlling families’ large undiversified equity positions provide the families with
greater incentives and capacity for both monitoring and expropriating (e.g., Burkart, Panunzi,
& Shleifer, 2003; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). This situation can lead
to family control having either a positive or negative impact on a firm’s cost of debt,
depending on whether family owners’ entrenchment incentive dominates their alignment
incentive. However, controlling families’ incentive per se is not directly observable.
Opaque corporate information leads outside investors to perceive that controlling
shareholders are more likely to expropriate outside investors, compared to when information
is more transparent (Anderson, Duru, & Reeb, 2009; Fan & Wong, 2002; Francis, Schipper,
& Vincent, 2005b; Lang, Lins, & Miller, 2004; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). Wang (2006)
argues that greater information asymmetry between controlling families and other investors is
one source of entrenchment for the controlling families. Thus, opaque information deters
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outside investors from investing in the firms and increases the cost of external financing (La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000; Myers & Majluf, 1984). In contrast, more
transparent information restrains controlling families from opportunistic behavior because
their appropriation of private benefits is more likely to be detected by outside investors in this
situation. The preceding analysis thus implies that as corporate information opacity increases,
either the controlling families’ positive (entrenchment) effect on the cost of debt is intensified
or the negative (alignment) effect is weakened.
In this paper, we examine how corporate information opacity affects the impact of
family control (i.e., the interactive impact of corporate opacity and family control) on the cost
of external debt financing, using a sample of 3320 firm-year observations of privately (i.e.,
nonstate) controlled but publicly listed firms in China between 2004 and 2010. We follow the
approach of Anderson et al. (2009) to measure corporate opacity with a comprehensive index
that consists of four components based on stock trading information and analyst coverage.
Our univariate statistics and multivariate results show that family firms in China on average
pay a substantially lower cost of debt relative to nonfamily firms, which we attribute to
family firms being overall significantly less opaque than nonfamily firms. Our findings
suggest that for controlling families in China as a whole, their alignment incentive seems to
dominate their entrenchment incentive. We further find that family control reduces the cost of
debt only in firms with relatively less opaque information. In the full sample, the interaction
between family ownership/control and corporate opacity is positive and significant, which
suggests that the negative impact of family control on the cost of debt becomes weaker as
corporate opacity increases. The results confirm our analysis that corporate opacity plays a
moderating role in the relationship between family control and the cost of debt.
Our research design allows us to dig deeper into the drivers of the moderating role of
corporate opacity. One important feature of the institutional environment in China is the wide
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regional disparity in economic development and institutional efficiency. 1 The cross-region
disparity in institutional environment allows us to examine whether and how the moderating
role of firm-level corporate opacity is further influenced by the institutional environment such
as overall marketization and legal protection of property rights at the province level, which
affect outside investors’ perception of controlling families’ incentives and capacity to engage
in expropriation activities (Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010; Ellul et al., 2007; La Porta et al.,
2000). At the same time, because business laws, culture, and social norms are basically the
same across China, in comparison with multi-country studies, our single-country setting
enables us to better disentangle the impact of institutional efficiency from that of other
country-level factors.
We conjecture that corporate opacity, as an indicator of controlling shareholder’s
alignment/entrenchment incentives, plays a greater moderating role in the relationship
between family control and the cost of debt when institutions such as marketization and
property rights protection are relatively weaker. The empirical evidence supports our
expectation in that the interaction between family ownership and corporate opacity is
significant only for firms located in provinces with relatively weaker institutions. The finding
is consistent with the notion that investors’ perception of expropriation by controlling
families, which is more severe when external institutions are weaker (Claessens, Djankov,
Fan, & Lang, 2002; Lins, Volpin, & Wagner, 2013), motivates creditors to demand more
1

For instance, in a 2006 report the World Bank surveys investment climate of 120 cities (and 12,400 firms)

across 30 provinces (i.e., all provinces excluding Tibet) in China and finds wide cross-region variation in
investment climate. For example, per capita GDP in Southeast China averages more than 150% above Central
and Southwest China. Firms in the 10th percentile of cities (in terms of government intervention and efficiency)
spend an average 36 days per year interacting with major bureaucracies, compared to 87 days for firms in the
bottom 10th percentile cities. Fan, Wang, and Zhu (2011) largely confirm the inequality in economic and market
development as well as government efficiency at the province level.
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transparent information to enable better monitoring. Consequently, the impact of family
control on the cost of debt is more sensitive to corporate opacity.
In addition to the disparity in institutional environment, we also consider two other
factors reportedly related to the controlling shareholders’ alignment/entrenchment incentives.
Prior studies find that controlling shareholders have greater incentives to expropriate outsider
investors when the divergence of controlling shareholders’ control rights from cash flow
rights (control-ownership wedge) is larger (Claessens et al., 2002; Johnson, La Porta, Shleifer,
& Lopez-de-Silanes, 2000; Lin et al., 2011) and for Chinese private firms when they are not
politically connected (Ma, Ma, & Tian, 2013). Consistent with these findings, we find that
increasing corporate opacity is more likely to weaken the negative impact of family control
on debt cost when the controlling families’ moral hazard of expropriation is higher; that is,
when the control-ownership wedge is higher and a firm is not politically connected.
Our findings are robust to alternative measures of corporate opacity. We use two
alternative measures in our robustness check, discretionary accruals and external auditor
identity (i.e., whether the external auditor is a large auditor). Both are well documented in the
literature as plausible opacity measures (e.g., Armstrong, Guay, & Weber, 2010; Francis,
Lafond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2005a) that the management of the firm initiates and has great
control over. Our findings are also robust to controlling for the endogeneity concerns about
family ownership and the relationship between information disclosure and cost of capital
(Nikolaev & van Lent, 2005). We apply the instrumental variable (IV) approach and estimate
two-stage least squares regressions. Prior studies (e.g., Adams, Almeida, & Ferreira, 2009;
Fahlenbrach, 2009) find that a firm is more likely to remain family controlled if the name of
the firm at the time of initial public offering (IPO) contains at least part of the personal
name(s) of the founder(s) and if a firm has more than one founder from different families;
however, no evidence suggests that these factors have an impact on a firm’s cost of debt. We
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therefore use dummy variables of Personal name and Multiple founders as IVs for family
ownership. We then employ two additional IVs, Personal name*Opacity index and Multiple
founders*Opacity index, to instrument the interaction between family ownership and
corporate opacity (i.e., Family ownership*Opacity index), which is also subject to
endogenous concern (Kelejian, 1971). The results show that our findings are not driven by
the endogeneity of family control.
Our study contributes to the literature in three ways. First, by examining the
moderating role of corporate opacity in the relation between family control and debt costs,
this study reveals that the cost of debt, and to a broader extent the shareholder–debtholder
agency problem, is more sensitive to corporate opacity in family firms than in nonfamily
firms. This is particularly relevant for the Chinese market because existing studies focusing
on Chinese family firms, particularly in the field of the impact of family control on
shareholder–debtholder conflict, are limited (Cheng, 2014) despite the importance of family
firms to the overall Chinese economy. The implication from this study that family owners
should be viewed as a heterogeneous group of blockholders with firm-level difference in the
relative dominance of the alignment or entrenchment incentives also contributes to the small
but growing literature about family control on shareholder–debtholder agency problems.
Second, we identify corporate opacity as a channel through which family firms can
benefit from a lower cost of debt. More importantly, unlike country-level factors, corporate
opacity can be influenced by firm-level corporate governance. Anderson et al. (2003) find
that family firms pay lower costs of debt than nonfamily firms, but they treat all family firms
universally and do not show the circumstances. Ellul et al. (2007), however, find that family
firms originating from countries with a high level of investor protection benefit from a lower
cost of debt than nonfamily firms. However, country-level legal institutions are obviously
beyond the control of individual firms. We instead focus on firm-level corporate opacity,
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which is heavily influenced by internal corporate governance (Anderson et al., 2009; Fan &
Wong, 2002; Francis et al., 2005b; Lang et al., 2004; Leuz et al., 2003; Wang, 2006). We
provide clear evidence that the cost of debt in family firms is significantly and positively
associated with corporate opacity. We further show that the effect of corporate opacity on the
cost of debt in family firms is more pronounced in an environment with low marketization
and weak legal protection of property rights, which is exactly the situation in which family
firms are more likely to experience a higher cost of debt (Ellul et al., 2007). Our study also
provides important complementary evidence to prior literature that mainly uses data from
either the United States or multiple countries.
Third, we generate direct evidence that corporate opacity appears to be substantially
more important than some other factors examined by prior studies (e.g., control-ownership
wedge, legal institutions, and a firm’s political connection) in explaining the impact of family
control on the cost of debt. This finding has important implications for family firms. For
example, family firms commonly use various control-enhancing mechanisms to exercise
effective control with a relatively small equity ownership, which results in excess control
rights over cash flow rights, not only in developing countries but also in developed countries
such as the United States (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002;
Villalonga & Amit, 2009). Prior studies find that high control-ownership wedges would cause
family firms to pay higher costs of debt because of perceived high expropriating potential
(Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010; Lin et al., 2011). But we find that, even with high controlownership wedges, family firms can still benefit from lower costs of debt if corporate
information is relatively less opaque. In other words, family firms do not have to sacrifice
those important control-enhancing structures to benefit from lower costs of debt.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature and
presents our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample and data. Section 4 reports our main
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empirical results. Section 5 tests the robustness of our results to different opacity measures
and to various model specifications. Finally, Section 6 sets forth our conclusion.

2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
The presence of a dominant and powerful family blockholder reshapes a firm’s
agency problems (La Porta et al., 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The literature so far has
provided only limited direct theoretical analysis on how controlling families’ unique
positions and incentives affect their firms’ cost of debt. Furthermore, empirical evidence has
been inconclusive so far. In this section, we first review pertinent existing studies. We then
rely on this literature to develop our hypotheses on how corporate information opacity affects
the impact of family ownership/control on the cost of debt.

2.1. Empirical Evidence on the Impact of Family Ownership on Cost of Debt
Anderson et al. (2003), using a sample of S&P 500 firms, find that family firms on
average pay 32 basis points lower than nonfamily firms on debt financing. The authors
attribute this lower debt cost to families’ interest in their firms’ long-term survival and the
families’ concern for their reputation, which give them a strong incentive to alleviate agency
conflict between large shareholders and debtholders. However, the conclusion in Anderson et
al. (2003) may not be automatically generalizable to China for the following reason.
The sample firms in Anderson et al. (2003) are based in the United States, which is
widely considered to have strong investor protection and creditor rights, while China has a
considerably weaker institutional environment. The literature (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002;
Lins et al., 2013) has found that the incentive and capacity of controlling shareholders to
extract private benefits of control largely depend on external investor protection in the
country in which a firm is located. Controlling families’ concentrated ownership and
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dominant position may give them both the incentive and capacity to abuse their control and to
expropriate minority shareholders and creditors (e.g., Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
& Shleifer, 2008; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Johnson et al., 2000); however, families’ strong
interest in the long-term survival of their firms motivates them to take a long-term and lowrisk approach (Achleitner, Gunther, Kaserer, & Siciliano, 2014; Anderson et al., 2003;
Fahlenbrach, 2009). The analysis suggests that, compared to nonfamily blockholders, family
ownership/control can either exacerbate or alleviate shareholder–debtholder agency conflicts
and hence increase or reduce debt cost, depending on external institutions. Consistent with
this view, Ellul et al. (2007) find that family firms in countries with high investor protection
benefit from lower debt costs, but experience higher debt costs in countries with low investor
protection.
In this paper, we first perform an initial test to determine if family firms have a lower
cost of debt relative to nonfamily firms in China, a country characterized by overall weak
investor protection. We then develop our hypotheses about the moderating role of firm-level
corporate information on the relationship between family control and cost of debt. Finally, we
hypothesize that the moderating role of corporate opacity is further influenced by controlling
families’ moral hazard of expropriation, and we then test this hypothesis.

2.2. Hypothesis Development
2.2.1. Corporate opacity and the impact of family control on firms’ cost of debt
Economic theory suggests that the relative opacity of a firm’s information can affect
the impact of family control on a firm’s cost of debt. It is well established that accounting and
financial information can be used to mitigate the agency conflicts between shareholders,
managers, and creditors (Bushman & Smith, 2001; Smith & Warner, 1979; Watts &
Zimmerman, 1986). With respect to external debt financing, the literature suggests that
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corporate information plays two crucial roles in mitigating agency conflicts between
shareholders, managers, and creditors.
First, corporate information plays a formal and explicit role in the negotiation and
setting of debt contracts. Creditors often require that debt contracts include certain clauses
and covenants that are based on accounting and financial information supplied by the
borrowing firms (Smith & Warner, 1979; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). Transparent corporate
information not only allows creditors to assess the borrowing firms’ ability to repay the debt,
but also enables creditors and borrowing firms to design clauses and covenants of debt
contracts that alleviate potential conflicts between debt-contracting parties. In other words,
more efficient debt contracts are possible when borrowing firms are committed to a more
transparent information environment (Armstrong et al., 2010). Therefore, relatively
transparent corporate information reduces lenders’ demand for monitoring and the extent of
the bonding mechanism (e.g., clauses and covenants of debt contracts), which in turn lowers
the costs of debt.
With respect to the cost of debt for our sample of Chinese family firms, a second and
possibly more important role of corporate opacity is in informal debt contracting, especially
in establishing the reputation of the controlling families and the working relationship between
borrowing firms and creditors. Although debt contracts between firms and creditors are
formal and explicit, informal contracts, which often comprise implicit multi-period
relationships, also play an important role in mitigating agency problems (Armstrong et al.,
2010; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). The importance of informal debt contracts is even more
significant in countries with weak formal institutions, where legal enforcement of formal
contracts is less effective and efficient (Armstrong et al., 2010). Armstrong et al. (2010)
suggest that informal debt contracts generally rely more on borrowing firms’ commitment to
transparent information and less on the effectiveness of the regulatory and legal system.
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Therefore, when family firms have less commitment to transparent information (i.e., when
corporate information is relatively more opaque), the costs of informal debt contracting (e.g.,
negotiation, design, monitoring, and enforcement) are higher compared to when corporate
information is less opaque. Consequently, the costs of debt also increase as corporate opacity
increases.
Taken together, the preceding analysis suggests that relatively opaque corporate
information increases not only the costs of formal debt contracting, but also the costs of
informal debt contracting. This implies that the relative opacity of corporate information
affects the impact of family control on the cost of debt. As corporate opacity increases,
creditors demand higher returns from their investment to at least partially cover higher costs
of both formal and informal debt contracting. Thus, relatively opaque corporate information
will weaken the negative impact of family control on the cost of debt. Therefore, we state our
first hypothesis as follows:
H1: The impact of family control on the cost of debt becomes weaker as corporate
opacity increases.

2.2.2. Dominant shareholder moral hazard and the impact of corporate opacity on the
relationship between family control and firms’ cost of debt
We have theoretically inferred that family firms’ alignment incentive dominates their
entrenchment incentive when corporate information is relatively less opaque. However, it is
reasonable to assume that various important factors have an impact on the relative dominance
of these two types of incentive, and outside investors will adjust their perception accordingly.
For example, a large wedge of control rights and cash flow rights may signal that controlling
shareholders are more likely to expropriate outside investors (Claessens et al., 2002; Johnson
et al., 2000; Lin et al., 2011; Shleifer and & Vishny, 1997). A weak institutional environment
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is also likely to foster firms’ expropriation behavior (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; La Porta et al.,
2000).
If creditors perceive a higher probability of opportunistic and expropriating behavior
by controlling families, they have a greater incentive to monitor the controlling families more
closely in order to protect their investments in the firms. In this process, creditors may
demand more transparent information and accordingly set debt-contracting terms that are
more sensitive to the transparency of corporate information. Because corporate information is
perceived to be more opaque and less credible when controlling families are more likely to
expropriate outside investors (Leuz et al., 2003), creditors may require higher returns on their
lending to compensate for the higher risk. However, when controlling families’ perceived
probability of expropriation is low, creditors are less concerned about being expropriated.
Therefore, creditors have a lower demand for transparent information, and consequently their
lending terms, including the required returns, are likely to be less tied to the transparency of
corporate information. In other words, corporate information opacity matters more when the
potential agency conflicts between controlling families and creditors are more severe.
Formally, we state our second hypothesis as
H2: The impact of corporate opacity on the relationship between family control and
the cost of debt is stronger when the perceived expropriation potential by controlling
shareholders is greater.

3. Sample, Data, and Statistics
3.1. Sample Selection and Data Sources
Our initial sample consists of all privately controlled (i.e., the ultimate largest
shareholder is neither a state-owned enterprise nor a government agency) nonfinancial Ashare issuing firms listed on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange or the Shenzhen Stock
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Exchange between 2004 and 2010. Substantial changes in accounting standards occurred in
2003, and therefore we choose 2004 as our sample beginning year to have consistency in the
treatment of accounting items used in our analysis. We first exclude firms in which the
ultimate largest shareholder is a foreign entity and firms that are cross-listed overseas because
foreign accounting rules may affect the treatment of some accounting items used in this study.
We then delete observations for the first year of public listing because an IPO may affect at
least three of the four components of the corporate opacity index used in this study: analyst
coverage, trading volume, and stock return volatility (Cliff & Denis, 2004; Ellis, 2006; Rajan
& Servaes, 1997). After we delete observations with missing data, our final sample consists
of 705 firms and 3320 firm-year observations.
We obtain our accounting and financial data from the China Securities Market and
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. Compiled by Shenzhen GTA Information
Technology Company Ltd., CSMAR is one of the most widely used databases for research on
the Chinese stock market. Data used to construct the corporate opacity index is also from
CSMAR. We winsorize all continuous variables used in the multivariate tests at the 1% and
99% level to minimize the impact of outliers.
3.2. Measurement of Variables
3.2.1. Cost of debt
Some prior studies (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003; Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010; Ellul et
al., 2007) measure the cost of debt as the spread between corporate bond yield and a
benchmark (e.g., U.S. treasury yield or LIBOR). The corporate bond market, however, is
underdeveloped in China and many other emerging economies. Therefore, we follow Kim,
Simunic, Stein, and Yi (2011), Pittman and Fortin (2004), and Sanchez-Ballesta and GarciaMeca (2011) to measure a firm’s cost of debt as its interest expense for the year divided by
the average short-term and long-term debt during the year. Chinese public firms do not
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always explicitly disclose interest expense in their income statements; rather they integrate
interest expense into an accounting item called ‘financial expense’, which includes interest
expense, interest income, profit and loss on foreign exchanges, and various fees and charges
by financial institutions. Most firms disclose the breakdown of financial expense in the notes
to income statements. We therefore manually collect the data of interest expense by checking
the notes and drop those firm-year observations that do not disclose interest expense either in
the income statements or in the notes to the income statements.
A concern exists, however, that our sample firms may on average be less opaque than
the overall listed firms, because opaque firms are less likely to disclose detailed information
about interest expenses and therefore dropped from our sample. We address this concern with
alternative opaque measures in the robustness tests.
3.2.2. Key independent variables
3.2.2.1. Family firms
Despite the extensive literature on family firms, no universally accepted definition of
family firms exists (see Prencipe, Bar-Yosef, & Dekker (2014) for an extensive review).
Because of concentrated ownership in many European and East Asian countries, researchers
commonly apply a minimum threshold for the largest shareholders’ ownership to ensure
effective control (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; Fan & Wong, 2002). In this study, we use a
dummy variable (Family dummy) to denote a family firm if (1) the founder and members of
the founding family (either by blood or through marriage) hold at least 20% of the firm’s
control rights; and (2) the founding family (all family members combined) is the ultimate
largest shareholder. 2

2

Of our 3320 firm-year observations, 1092 satisfy our definition of family firms. If we relax the definition by

removing the 20% threshold for control rights, the number of family firms increases to 1210. As an additional
test, we run all regressions using this alternative definition. Our main results remain qualitatively unchanged. If
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In addition to the criteria above, we apply three other rules in defining a family firm,
given the unique characteristics of the Chinese markets. First, unlike in the United States,
where almost all family firms are in the hands of second or later generations (Ellul et al.,
2007), founders still control the vast majority of publicly listed family firms in China. While
Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2012) define such firms as entrepreneurial firms, we regard these
firms as family firms to maintain consistency with most other studies. Second, if a firm is
established by more than one family, we regard the family with the largest control rights as
the controlling family. Third, natural persons were not allowed to own or control a business
until some years after the start of the economic reform in 1979; until then many businesses
were registered as village and town enterprises (VTEs) even if they were founded and
controlled by natural persons. These firms were later re-registered as private enterprises when
new laws permitted the private ownership of business. These firms are regarded as family
firms if they meet the two criteria of our family firm definition (i.e., ultimate largest
shareholder with at least 20% control rights). In some other cases, managers of VTEs later
became the controlling shareholders through management buyouts. We view these firms as
nonfamily firms even if the controlling shareholders have more than 20% of control rights, to
be consistent with prior literature (e.g., Ellul et al., 2007; Fahlenbrach, 2009).
As in prior literature, we also use a continuous variable (Family ownership) to
measure family ownership, which is the fractional equity ownership of the founding family if
a firm is classified as a family firm and zero for all nonfamily firms.
3.2.2.2. Corporate opacity

we remove the second criterion, the number of family firms remains the same. In other words, when the
founding family holds at least 20% of control rights, no other blockholders hold more than 20% control right.
This also implies that concentration of equity ownership is even higher in family-controlled firms.
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Following Anderson et al. (2009), we develop a corporate opacity index that ranks the
relative opacity of each firm-year observation. Our corporate opacity index consists of four
components; namely, trading volume, analyst coverage, proportion of zero-return trading
days, and stock return volatilities. The intuitions drawn from these corporate information
opacity proxies are well known. We elaborate on them briefly.
Investors are more willing to buy or to sell a company’s shares when less information
asymmetry is present. Thus, trading volume is an inverse proxy for information opacity (Leuz
& Verrecchia, 2000). We measure trading volume as the average daily number of shares
traded divided by the average total number of shares outstanding during the year. Financial
analysts play an important role as informational intermediaries between the firm and the
market (Lang et al., 2004). The larger the number of financial analysts following a firm, the
more intensive is the market scrutiny of the firm’s financial information. We measure analyst
coverage as the natural logarithm of the number of financial analysts following the firm. Our
third proxy for corporate opacity is the proportion of zero-return trading days over the year.
Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) argue that the incidence of zero daily return is a
liquidity measure that captures the relative value of information signals to the trading costs.
They find that the proportion of zero-return trading days for NYSE/AMEX stocks is highly
correlated to the bid–ask spread, a well-known proxy for information asymmetry. More
recently Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2007) suggest that this measure is particularly
useful for emerging markets where detailed transaction data are often not available and are of
relatively poor quality. Our final proxy for information opacity is the volatility of daily stock
returns. Lang and Lundholm (1993) suggest that the level of stock price volatility is
negatively related to information asymmetries between the firm and investors. We measure
volatility as the standard deviation of daily stock returns (dividend adjusted) during the year.
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To construct the corporate opacity index, we first calculate the four individual
components of opacity. We next rank each of these four components into deciles, with a
value of 9 representing the most opaque firms and a value of 0 representing the least opaque
firms. As a result, we obtain a new set of variables, Rankvolume, Rankanalyst,
Rankzeroreturn, and Rankvolatility. We then sum these four components and divide the result
by a factor of 36, which is the maximum possible value. This process yields a corporate
opacity index that ranges from 0 to 0.9, with higher values indicating greater information
opacity.
3.2.3. Control variables
Firm characteristics other than ownership structure and corporate opacity may also
affect a firm’s cost of debt. Consistent with the literature (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003; Lin et
al., 2011; Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Pittman & Fortin, 2004), we include a set of firm
characteristics as control variables in our regressions. These control variables are firm size,
the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, the ratio of debt to total assets, a dummy variable
indicating negative equity, the ratio of current assets to current liabilities, the ratio of
operating cash flows to total assets, sales growth, board size, and the ratio of outside directors
to the total number of directors. Theoretical and empirical evidence on the impact of these
variables on the cost of debt is relatively well known. Detailed descriptions of all variables
used in this study are provided in Table 1.
We also include year and industry dummy variables in our multivariate OLS analyses.
Industry dummy variables are based on the classification system published by the China
Securities Regulatory Commission, which classifies all listed firms into 13 broad industries
(12 industries if the financial service industry is excluded).
< Insert Table 1 about here>
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3.3. Descriptive Statistics
Panel A and Panel B of Table 2 report the distribution of family firms and nonfamily
firms by year and industry, respectively. Panel A shows that the number and percentage of
family firms rose steadily, except for a small drop in percentage terms between 2005 and
2006. In 2004, the Chinese government established the Small and Medium Enterprise Board
(SMEB) under the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. A large proportion of all IPOs on the SMEB
were family firms. Family firms represent about 32.9% of all firm-year observations in our
sample. The percentage of family firms increased to 42.7% as of the end of 2010, from about
22.5% in 2004. This highlights the importance of studying the impact of family firms on the
cost of debt.
<Insert Tables 2 about here>
Panel B shows that the number and the percentage of family firms varied significantly
across industries. The manufacturing industry had by far the largest number of family firms,
reflecting the fact that it also represented the largest industry by the total number of listed
firms. Also notable was the absence of family firms in the power, gas, and water supply
industry. This absence is not surprising, given that this highly regulated industry is
monopolized by newly privatized former state-owned enterprises.
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics, broken down by family firms and nonfamily
firms. Family firms on average pay a significantly lower cost of debt (0.577 percentage points
or about 10% lower) than nonfamily firms. The difference is significant at the 1% level. The
opacity index is 0.427 for family firms and 0.446 for nonfamily firms, with a difference of
0.019 or about 4.5%, which is also significant at the 1% level.
<Insert Table 3 about here>
Family firms are, on average, significantly larger than nonfamily firms (2.74 billion
versus 2.14 billion of total assets). Compared with nonfamily firms, family firms have a
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significantly lower PPE ratio (0.240 versus 0.261), which may imply that family firms invest
more in R&D. Family firms have a significantly lower debt ratio (0.451 versus 0.665) but a
higher current ratio (2.105 versus 1.647) relative to nonfamily firms, indicating that family
firms may prefer a low-risk capital structure. Family firms also have a higher ratio of outside
directors than nonfamily firms (0.366 versus 0.361). We do not find a significant difference
in cash flow performance, sales growth, and board size between family and nonfamily firms.
To summarize, family firms and nonfamily firms differ significantly in their cost of
debt and corporate opacity. They also differ in firm size, capital structure, investment, and
internal corporate governance. We next formally assess how these factors affect the
difference in the cost of debt between these two groups of firms.

4. Multivariate Results
4.1. Impact of Family Control on the Cost of Debt
In Section 2.1, we propose that the negative impact of family ownership on the cost of
debt documented in Anderson et al. (2003) may not hold for the Chinese market. To test this
conjecture, we estimate the following ordinary least square regression model, which makes
our results directly comparable with prior empirical evidence:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖 , 𝑡

= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡 ( 𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖 𝑡)
,
,
+ Σ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑗 + Σ 𝛽𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡

+Σ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖 , 𝑡

Equation (1)

The detailed descriptions of all variables are reported in Table 1.
Standard errors of the OLS regression results reported in columns 1 and 3 of Table 4
are corrected for firm-level clustering. The coefficients of Family ownership and Family
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dummy are -1.480 and -0.377, respectively, and both are statistically different from zero at the
1% level. The results confirm the univariate differences reported in Table 3 that family
control is associated with a lower cost of debt. The findings here and in Anderson et al. (2003)
suggest that family firms have lower costs of debt both in China and the United States,
despite the immense difference in investor protection and other institutions. However, our
findings are not consistent with the findings documented in Ellul et al. (2007), which suggests
that family firms in countries with weak institutions (such as China) experience higher debt
cost than nonfamily firms-. This inconsistence motivates us to examine other factors (rather
than country-level institutions) that may affect the impact of family control on the cost of
debt.
<Insert Table 4 about here>
Except for the estimate of the ratio of outside directors, the OLS coefficients of
control variables (columns 1 and 3) have the predicted signs. Specifically, firms that pay a
lower cost of debt are larger in size and have lower risk and better performance, compared to
firms that pay a higher cost of debt. The OLS results, however, do not suggest a significant
association between the cost of debt and a firm’s growth, board size, and board independence.
The OLS results for the control variables reported in Table 4 are similar to those in prior
studies (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003; Petersen & Rajan, 1994; Pittman & Fortin, 2004).
There is, however, a concern that some firm-specific variables may be omitted,
causing the OLS results to be biased. Nikolaev and van Lent (2005) suggest that fixed effects
estimations reduce endogeneity bias. We therefore use a fixed effects model to correct for
unspecified heteroskedasticity, which takes into account heterogeneity among individual
firms. The results are reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 4. The coefficients of Family
ownership and Family dummy remain negative and statistically different from zero (albeit
with lower significances), confirming the OLS results reported in columns 1 and 3. Overall,
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the results in Table 4 provide evidence that family control on average is associated with
lower costs of debt in China.
In all subsequent analyses, for brevity we present only the results using family
ownership as the key independent variable. Results are similar when we replace family
ownership with the family control dummy. The constant term and control variables are also
included in all regressions, but their coefficients are not reported. 3

4.2. Impact of Corporate Opacity on the Relationship between Family Control and the Cost
of Debt
4.2.1. Primary test of Hypothesis H1
The literature finds that entrenched controlling shareholders tend to supply relatively
more opaque information to outside investors (Anderson et al., 2009; Fan & Wong, 2002;
Lang et al., 2004; Leuz et al., 2003). We argue that the negative effect of family control on
the firm’s cost of debt is consequently expected to be weaker when corporate opacity is
relatively higher. To examine the moderating role of corporate opacity, we carry out two sets
of tests.
We first divide our full sample into two subsamples based on the level of corporate
opacity. Low-opacity firms are defined as those for which the opacity index is below the
sample median. High-opacity firms are defined as those for which the opacity index is above
the sample median. For each of these two subsamples, we then rerun our baseline regression
model described in Equation 1. The results are reported in Table 5. Second, to explicitly
examine the joint effect of corporate opacity and family control on the cost of debt, we
estimate the following OLS model as well as the corresponding firm-fixed effects model:

3

However, those results are available on request.
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖 , 𝑡

= 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡 ( 𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖 𝑡)
,
,
+ 𝛽2 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑡

(𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖 𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡)
,
,

+𝛽3𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑡 + Σ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑗

+Σ 𝛽𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡 + Σ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖, 𝑡

Equation (2)

The results for regressions based on Equation 2 are reported in Table 6.
<Insert Table 5 and Table 6 about here>
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 report the Equation 1 regression results for the subsample
with relatively low opacity. The coefficient of Family ownership is negative and significant at
either the 1% level (coef. = -2.061 in column 1) or the 5% level (coef. = -1.037 in column 2).
The result is similar to that in Table 4 but with larger coefficients. However, the coefficient of
Family ownership in columns 3 and 4, which represent the relatively more opaque subsample,
is not only insignificant (albeit with a negative sign), but also smaller than that in columns 1
and 2. To formally test whether the coefficients of Family ownership in these two subsamples
differ significantly, we apply the cross-equation restriction tests. The results show that the
coefficients are significantly different (p-value = 0.003 for columns 1 and 3; p-value = 0.018
for columns 2 and 4). To appreciate the economic significance of our findings, consider the
coefficients reported in columns 1 and 3 of Table 5. When corporate opacity is below the
median (column 1) a one-standard-deviation increase in family ownership (an increase of
about 18%) reduces debt cost by 0.373 percentage points. However, when corporate opacity
is above the median (column 3) a one-standard-deviation increase in family ownership (about
17%) lowers debt cost by only about 0.077 percentage points.
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The results in Table 5 provide evidence that the negative impact of family ownership
on the cost of debt is stronger when corporate opacity is relatively low.
In Equation 2 we extend our baseline model from Equation 1 by adding an interaction
term between family firm and corporate opacity. Both models in Table 6 show that, as
expected, the coefficient of the stand-alone Family ownership remains negative and
statistically

significant,

while

the

coefficient

of

the

interaction

term

Family

ownership*Opacity index is positive and significant. The opposite signs of these two
coefficients imply that as corporate opacity increases, the negative impact of family
ownership on the cost of debt becomes weaker. In other words, the negative impact of family
ownership on the cost of debt is strongest when corporate opacity equals zero. 4
Taken together, the results in Table 5 and Table 6 indicate that when corporate
opacity is in the lowest decile (i.e., Opacity index = 0), family firms have significantly lower
costs of debt than nonfamily firms. However, as corporate opacity increases, the difference in
the cost of debt becomes insignificant. These results provide strong support for hypothesis
H1 that the impact of family control on the cost of debt is affected by corporate opacity.
Specifically, the negative impact of family control on the cost of debt becomes weaker as
corporate opacity increases.
4.2.2. Endogeneity of family control
One potential endogeneity concern exists regarding our results about the impact of
family firms on the cost of debt and the moderating role of corporate opacity on such an
impact. In particular, we explicitly assume the causality running from family control (or
family ownership) to a lower cost of debt. However, it is also possible that an inverse

4

Recall that in constructing the corporate opacity index, we rank each of the four components into deciles (from

0 to 9) and divide the sum by 36. Thus, a zero opacity index value does not indicate zero information asymmetry;
rather, it means each of the four components is in the lowest decile of opacity.
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causality is present. Specifically, a lower cost of debt indicates better firm performance,
ceteris paribus. It is intuitive to argue that founding families are more likely to retain control
when their firms perform well. We address this potential endogeneity issue in this section
with the IV approach.
An appropriate IV needs to satisfy two conditions. First, the IV needs to be exogenous
in the main regressions. Second, the IV must be correlated to the endogenous variable,
conditional on other covariates. Fahlenbrach (2009) finds that family-controlled firms are
significantly more likely to be bearing the name(s) of the founder(s) at the time of IPO.
However, we find no reason to believe that the name of a firm at the time of IPO is related to
its current cost of debt. We follow Fahlenbrach (2009) to define Personal name as a dummy
variable that equals 1 if the name of the firm at the time of IPO contains at least part of the
personal name(s) of the founder(s) and zero otherwise. We use Personal name as an IV for
family control.
We use a dummy variable concerning multiple founders as another IV for family
control. Adams et al. (2009) argue that a firm is more likely to remain controlled by one of
the founders if it was founded by more than one founder. But we find no systematic evidence
that a firm having more than one founder has a direct effect on its cost of debt. Therefore,
Multiple founders, which is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has more than one
founder (from different families), also serves the purpose of a good IV.
In estimating IV regressions, we employ the full sample with interaction terms of
family ownership and corporate opacity. If family ownership is subject to endogeneity
concerns, then the interaction of family ownership and opacity index may also be endogenous
as suggested by Kelejian (1971). Therefore, we follow the practice in Angrist and Pischke
(2009) and Kim and Lu (2011) to model Family ownership and Family ownership*Opacity
index as endogenous variables and estimate a two-stage least squares regression model. We
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use Personal name, Multiple founders, and their interactions with the exogenous variable (i.e.,
Personal name*Opacity index and Multiple founders*Opacity index) as our IVs. In the first
stage, each endogenous variable is regressed on IVs and control variables. The F-statistics in
the first stage (unreported but available on request) indicate that the coefficients of the IVs
are significantly different from zero at the 1% level, providing further support for the validity
of our IVs.
In the second stage, the predicted values from the first-stage regressions are used as
key independent variables. Table 7 reports the second-stage regression results with the cost of
debt as the dependent variable. As can been seen, the coefficients of Family ownership and
Family ownership*Opacity index have the same sign as the corresponding coefficients in
Table 6, but with even larger magnitudes. For example, the coefficients of Family ownership
and Family ownership*Opacity index in column 1 of Table 7 are -6.091 and 8.070,
respectively, compared to -3.182 and 4.527 in column 1 of Table 6. Thus, the results from the
IV regressions are consistent with our earlier analyses and support hypothesis H1 that
corporate opacity weakens the negative impact of family control on the cost of debt. This
finding is robust to controlling for potential endogeneity concerns.
<Insert Table 7 about here>

4.3. Controlling Shareholders’ Moral Hazard of Expropriation and the Role of Corporate
Opacity on the Impact of Family Control on the Cost of Debt
In this section, we aim to explore some factors that influence the mechanism through
which corporate opacity affects the relationship between family control and the cost of debt.
In particular, we focus on factors that are related to the potential incentives of dominant
controlling families to expropriate outside investors because such incentives directly impact
creditors’ demand for transparent corporate information and consequently the sensitivity of
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the impact of family control on the cost of debt to corporate opacity (refer to our discussion
in Section 2.2.2). Specifically, we examine how the moderating effect of corporate opacity is
affected by the following factors: the divergence between controlling families’ control rights
and cash flow rights (i.e., control-ownership wedge), external institutions (market
development and property rights protection), and firms’ political connections.
4.3.1. Control-ownership wedge
Previous studies show that for many firms around the world the ultimate largest
shareholders exercise effective control over the firms with a relatively small equity ownership
(Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002), resulting in a divergence between the ultimate
largest shareholders’ control rights and cash flow rights. In the presence of the controlownership wedge, controlling shareholders have a greater incentive and ability to expropriate
outside investors, which often causes a firm’s value to be discounted (Claessens et al., 2002;
Johnson et al., 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). Consistent with
this view, Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) and Lin et al. (2011) find that the cost of debt
financing is significantly higher for firms with higher control-ownership wedges, especially
when the ultimate largest shareholders are families. As a result, creditors have a greater
incentive to monitor firms with higher wedges to ensure their investments are not
expropriated by the controlling shareholders. Consequently, the impact of family firms on the
cost of debt is expected to be more sensitive to corporate opacity when the control-ownership
wedge is high. In other words, the joint effect between family firms and corporate opacity is
expected to be stronger for firms with a higher wedge. To test this proposition, we divide our
full sample into low-wedge and high-wedge subsamples. The low-wedge subsample contains
those firms that have a control-ownership wedge below the sample median; the high-wedge
subsample contains those firms with a control-ownership wedge above the sample median.
We repeat the testing in Equation 2 for each subsample. The results are reported in Table 8.
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<Insert Table 8 about here>
In all four model specifications, the coefficient of the stand-alone Family ownership is
negative and significantly different from zero, indicating that when corporate opacity is in the
lowest decile (i.e., Opacity index = 0), family firms have a lower cost of debt than nonfamily
firms, regardless of the size of control-ownership wedge. This finding seems to differ from
that of Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) and Lin et al. (2011), who find that the positive impact
of family ownership on the cost of debt becomes significantly stronger as the controlownership wedge increases. Our explanation is that for Chinese family firms as a whole,
controlling families’ alignment effect is so dominant over their entrenchment effect that even
a high control-ownership wedge does not significantly change the overall negative impact of
family control on the firms’ cost of debt.
However, the interactive impact of family ownership and corporate opacity on the
cost of debt differs significantly between high-wedge firms and low-wedge firms. In firms
with high control-ownership wedges (columns 1 and 2), the coefficient of Family
ownership*Opacity index is positive and significant at the 1% level. By contrast, neither of
the coefficients of the interaction terms is significant for firms with low control-ownership
wedges (columns 3 and 4). Cross-equation restriction tests show that the coefficient of
Family ownership*Opacity index in the high-wedge subsample is significantly larger than
that in the low-wedge subsample (p-value = 0.008 for columns 1 and 3; p-value = 0.000 for
columns 2 and 4). The results in Table 8 therefore support our expectation that the negative
impact of family ownership on the cost of debt is reduced by corporate opacity. More
importantly, the reduction is more significant when the controlling shareholders’ controlownership wedge is relatively high.
We also note that the coefficient of Opacity index is positive and significantly
different from zero at the 1% or 5% level when controlling shareholders’ control-ownership
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wedge is relatively high (columns 1 and 2); but when the control-ownership wedge is
relatively low, the coefficient is only marginally significant at the 10% level (column 3) or
insignificant (columns 4). Cross-equation restriction tests show that the coefficient of Opacity
index in the high-wedge subsample is significantly larger than that in the low-wedge
subsample (p-value = 0.024 for columns 1 and 3; p-value = 0.071 for columns 2 and 4).
These results are consistent with the notion that creditors have a greater demand for
transparent information when controlling shareholders’ expropriation potential is higher.
These results also confirm the empirical evidence in some previous studies such as Lin et al.
(2011).
4.3.2. Market development and legal protection of property rights
The literature argues that institutional development is important in mitigating agency
conflicts and in curbing private benefits of control (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; La Porta et al.,
2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Recent studies also show that external institutions (legal
protection of investors in particular) are negatively associated with the cost of debt (Boubakri
& Ghouma, 2010; Qi, Roth, & Wald, 2010). The analysis in Section 2 of this paper indicates
that when controlling families are entrenched, corporate information becomes more opaque
and the negative impact of family control on the cost of debt becomes substantially weaker.
In this section, we take advantage of the significant variation in economic and legal
development among China’s diverse regions to test whether the development of institutions
affects the moderating role of corporate opacity on the relationship between family control
and the cost of debt. When external institutions are stronger, it is more difficult or more
costly for controlling families (and more broadly, controlling shareholders) to extract private
benefits from their control of the firms (Dyck & Zingales, 2004). Thus, in regions with
stronger legal protection and more advanced market development, even controlling families
with relatively more opaque information find it difficult or costly to take advantage of
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corporate opacity to expropriate outside investors. In other words, the moderating effect of
corporate opacity on the relationship between family control and the cost of debt is weaker
when external institutions are relatively more developed.
The testing in this section is based on Fan et al. (2011), who evaluate a wide range of
economic and institutional factors in China and construct a range of indices to measure these
factors at the provincial level. The indices were available up to 2009 at the time we were
developing this paper. Therefore, the sample period is 2004–2009 in this section. We focus
on two indices obtained from Fan et al. (2011) as proxies for institutional development at the
provincial level. Market development is an index that measures the overall level of
marketization of the province in which a firm is headquartered. A higher market development
index value indicates a higher level of marketization. Property rights protection is an index
that measures the level of legal protection of property rights in the province in which a firm is
headquartered, with a higher index value indicating a higher level of legal protection. As in
Section 4.3.1, we divide our full sample into two subsamples, based on whether the level of
market development and property rights protection is below or above the sample median,
respectively. We report the results in Table 9, with Panel A using market development as the
proxy for external institution and Panel B using property rights as the proxy for external
institutions.
<Insert Table 9 about here>
In the weak-institutions subsample (columns 1 and 2), the coefficients of Family
ownership*Opacity index are all positive and significant at either the 1% or 5% level,
indicating that in regions with weak institutions, high corporate opacity significantly weakens
the negative impact of family control on the cost of debt. However, the moderating effect of
corporate opacity becomes insignificant in regions with relatively strong institutions, which is
suggested by the smaller and insignificant coefficient of Family ownership*Opacity index in
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columns 3 and 4. We compare four pairs of coefficients of the interaction term (columns 1
and 3, and columns 2 and 4 in Panel A and Panel B, respectively) using the cross-equation
restriction tests. Among them the coefficients in columns 2 and 4 of Panel B differ at the 5%
level (p-value = 0.014); all other pairs of coefficients differ significantly at the 1% level.
Taken together, the results in this section support our proposition that the moderating
effect of corporate opacity is stronger when external institutions are weaker. We also note
that in all models in Table 9, the stand-alone coefficients of Family ownership are negative
and significantly different from zero, indicating that when corporate opacity is in the lowest
decile (i.e., Opacity index = 0), family firms pay a lower cost of debt than nonfamily firms,
regardless of the strength of external institutions. This finding complements that of Ellul et al.
(2007), who find that family firms pay a lower (higher) cost of debt than nonfamily firms in
countries with strong (weak) legal protection of investors. Our results suggest that, apart from
country-level external institutions, firm-level corporate opacity, also plays an important role
in explaining the actual impact of family control on the cost of debt.
Similar to the result in Table 8, the coefficient of the stand-alone Opacity index is
significantly positive when market development or property rights protection is low (columns
1 and 2 in Table 9), while the coefficient is generally less significant in situations with
relatively high market development or strong property rights protection (columns 3 and 4).
The coefficients of Opacity index in these two subsamples are significantly different
(columns 1 and 3 in Panel A have the largest p-value = 0.068). The results provide further
empirical support to our earlier analysis that corporate opacity matters more for the cost of
debt when controlling shareholders are more likely to expropriate outside investors.
4.3.3. Firms’ political connections
A number of studies examine the implication of political connection for controlling
shareholders’ incentives to expropriate outside investors. Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell
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(2006) find that politically connected firms are more likely to be bailed out by governments,
and Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee (2006) find that politically connected firms have preferential
access to loans from state-owned banks, which may suggest that controlling shareholders at
politically connected firms are less concerned about outside investors’ negative reaction to
expropriation.
However, Li, Meng, and Zhang (2006) and Ma, Ma, and Tian (2013) argue that in the
Chinese context, the primary motivation for private entrepreneurs to establish political
connections is to overcome the lack of well-functioning markets and market-supporting
institutions. . Despite the important contribution of the private sector to the overall economy,
private firms still face differential treatment in many aspects. For example, bank loans
disproportionately flow to state-owned enterprises even when they are not performing well.
In addition, private firms are often excluded from government procurements and projects, and
they are also frequently discriminated against in resource allocation (e.g., land, mines, and
certain licenses) and in the enforcement of contracts with governments or state-owned
enterprises (Chen, Li, Su, & Sun, 2011; Li, Meng, & Zhang, 2006). Such an imperfect market
mechanism highlights the importance of political capital and motivates private entrepreneurs
to enter politics or to establish political connections.
One of the most important ways for entrepreneurs to establish political connections is
to become members of either the Chinese People’s Congress (CPC) or the Chinese People’s
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), the two most important political organizations in
the Chinese political system. To show the advanced nature of the CPC and the CPPCC, only
elite entrepreneurs can be chosen as members. Therefore, to establish and to maintain the
highly valuable and competitive membership of the CPC or the CPPCC, controlling
shareholders have strong incentives to see their firms continue to perform well. Consistent
with this view, Ma et al. (2013) find that privately controlled firms with political connection
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have less tunneling than private firms without political connection. Therefore, following our
analysis in Section 2.2.2, we expect the interactive impact of family control and corporate
opacity on the cost of debt to be stronger for firms without political connection.
We follow Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007) and Ma et al. (2013) in defining a firm as
politically connected if either the chairman or the CEO of the firm is a current or former
government official, military officer, or member of the CPC or the CPPCC. We divide our
full sample into politically connected and nonconnected subsamples and separately test
Equation 2 for each subsample. The results are reported in Table 10.
<Insert Table 10 about here>
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 10 report the regression results for firms without political
connection, while columns 3 and 4 report the results for the connected subsample. Despite the
seemly big differences in the magnitude of the coefficients of the interaction term Family
ownership*Opacity index in these two subsamples, cross-equation restriction tests reveal that
they are not significantly different from each other (p-value = 0.123 for columns 1 and 3; pvalue = 0.487 for columns 2 and 4). However, the coefficient of Family ownership*Opacity
index is significant for firms without political connection, while the coefficient of the
interaction terms is insignificant for firms with political connection. Thus, the results in Table
10 provide marginal support for our expectation that the negative impact of family control on
the cost of debt is more likely to be reduced by corporate opacity for firms without political
connection than for firms with political connection.
In summary, the test results in Section 4.3 show that the moderating effect of
corporate opacity on the relationship between family firms and the cost of debt is affected by
the probability (incentive and capacity) of controlling shareholders expropriating outside
investors. Specifically, the moderating effect of corporate opacity is stronger when the
controlling shareholders’ control-ownership wedge is higher, when marketization and legal
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protection of property rights are weaker, and marginally stronger when firms are not
politically connected. Overall, the results provide support for hypothesis H2 that corporate
opacity plays a more important role in the relationship between family control and the cost of
debt when the moral hazard of dominant shareholders is greater. The results also indicate that
these three factors appear to be less important than corporate opacity in explaining the impact
of family control on the cost of debt.

5. Robustness Checks and Additional Tests
5.1. Robustness Checks Using Alternative Opacity Measures
So far in this paper, we have followed Anderson et al. (2009) and used a
comprehensive index consisting of four components (trading volume, analyst coverage, zeroreturn trading days, and stock return volatility) to measure corporate opacity. A concern
exists, however, that our corporate opacity index is basically a liquidity measure and/or it can
represent only the inherent information opacity of a firm that is less likely subject to the
managers’ control. In that case, our inference that family firms can benefit from a lower cost
of debt by reducing corporate opacity may be questioned. To address this concern, we
introduce earnings quality as an alternative proxy for information opacity measure. Earnings
quality is often negatively associated with earnings management that is initiated by managers
to alter information opacity. Managers have incentives to manage earnings to handle agency
problems with outside investors.
We use two earnings quality measures. The first measure is the unsigned (absolute
value) discretionary accruals calculated using the modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, &
Sweeney, 1995). Large discretionary accruals indicate low earnings quality and more opaque
information disclosure. We estimate discretionary accruals using the firm-year–specific
method (Francis, Lafond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2004) and a five-year rolling window. The
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estimates are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Due to data availability, we can only
obtain discretionary accruals for 2220 of the initial 3320 firm-year observations. Family firms
and nonfamily firms account for 485 and 1735 of the reduced sample, respectively.
Univariate testing shows no significant difference in discretionary accruals between
family and nonfamily firms (0.068 vs. 0.072, p-value = 0.225), suggesting that family firms
as a whole have similar earnings quality as nonfamily firms. However, we argue that family
firms are heterogeneous in their agency problems, which can be reflected in different
earnings quality among family firms. Thus, we replace opacity index with discretionary
accruals and rerun the regressions described in Section 4. The results are presented in
Appendix. As in the main results, we only report results for Family ownership. Results are
similar when we use the Family dummy. In Table A1, the negative impact of family
ownership on cost of debt exists only in firms with low discretionary accruals. Results in
Table A2 show that when discretionary accrual is zero, family controlled firms pay a
significantly lower cost of debt than nonfamily firms; however, the significant and positive
coefficient of Family ownership*Discretionary accruals indicates that discretionary accruals
mitigate the negative impact of family ownership on the cost of debt. The results in Tables
A3 to A5 suggest that the moderating effect of earnings quality (as a proxy for information
opacity) is significantly more profound when the perceived expropriation potential by control
shareholders is greater. Overall, the results are largely consistent with those reported in
Section 4, thus providing additional support for our hypotheses.
One notable observation from the results presented in the Appendix is that, except for
in two models (columns 1 and 5 of Table A4), the coefficient of the stand-alone
Discretionary accruals is insignificant, suggesting that earnings quality as measured by
discretionary accruals has no impact on the cost of debt for nonfamily firms. This finding
seems to be inconsistent with earlier evidence (e.g., Francis et al., 2005b; Sengupta, 1998).
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One possible explanation is that the overall earnings quality is relatively low for China’s
listed firms; therefore, creditors discount the information contained in earnings quality when
making lending decisions. However, the significant coefficient of the interaction term Family
ownership*Discretionary accruals indicates that earnings quality matters more for family
firms than for nonfamily firms for the reasons given in Section 2 of this paper.
Our second measure of earning quality is a dummy variable (Small auditor) denoting
high corporate opacity if a firm’s annual report is not audited by one of the international Big
Four or the largest six domestic auditors by revenue. 5 Numerous studies find a negative
association between the quality of external auditors and the opacity of the audited firms’
financial information (see Armstrong et al. (2010) for a comprehensive review of the related
literature). Untabulated results, which are available on request, suggest that our findings
remain robust to this alternative measure of corporate opacity.
5.2. Uniqueness of Family Blockholders and Different Effects of Founder, Non–Founder
Family, and Outside CEOs
We have so far provided evidence that family firms enjoy significantly lower costs of
debt than nonfamily firms when corporate opacity is relatively low, because the family
blockholders’ alignment effects dominate their entrenchment effects. However, it is possible
that this finding may also apply to all firms with concentrated blockholders who have a
relatively dominant position, rather than being limited to family firms.
To test whether family owners are different from other types of blockholders, we
divide all sample firms into three groups, namely firms with family blockholders, firms with
nonfamily blockholders, and firms without blockholders. We define blockholders as the
ultimate largest shareholders with at least 20% of control rights (we use 30% as an alternative

5

The international Big Four include Deloitte, E&Y, KPMG, and PwC. The six largest domestic auditors are

Shanghai Lixin, Xinyong Zhonghe, Yuehua, Daxin, Dahua, and Zhongshen.
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threshold). Untabulated results indicate that, while a significant difference is present in the
cost of debt between opaque and transparent family firms, no significant difference exists
between opaque and transparent firms with nonfamily blockholders and between opaque and
transparent firms without blockholders. In other words, corporate opacity matters more for
family firms than for nonfamily firms, in terms of its association with the cost of debt. This
finding provides further support for our choice of corporate opacity as the moderator in
examining the relationship between family control and the cost of debt.
We next classify family firms based on CEO type (i.e., founder, non–founder family,
or outside CEOs) to investigate the impact of CEO type on the cost debt. Untabulated results
show that only family firms with founder CEOs enjoy lower costs of debt than nonfamily
firms. Furthermore, the moderating role of corporate opacity becomes insignificant for family
firms with founder CEOs. These results indicate that, relative to family firms with family
member CEOs and outside CEOs, firms with founder CEOs are perceived to have fewer
agency problems between family blockholders and outside investors (Villalonga and Amit,
2006); consequently, the cost of debt of founder CEO firms is less sensitive to corporate
opacity.

5.3. Other Additional Tests
In our main analyses, we measure a firm’s cost of debt as its interest expense for the
year divided by the average short-term and long-term debt during the year. As mentioned in
Section 3.3.1, Chinese public firms often integrate interest expense into an accounting item
called ‘financial expense’, which includes interest expense, interest income, profit and loss on
foreign exchanges, and various fees and charges by financial institutions. As a robustness
check, we use firm-level financial expenses (scaled by total assets), rather than interest
expenses, as a proxy for the cost of debt. Financial expense is explicitly disclosed by every
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firm in their annual reports and is directly available from the CSMAR database, which
minimizes the possibility of mistakes in our manually collecting data from notes to the annual
reports. As interest expenses generally represent the largest component of a firm’s overall
financial expenses, we expect similar results to those reported in Section 4. We repeat all
tests in Table 4 to Table 10 using financial expenses (scaled by total assets) as the dependent
variable. The results generally confirm our expectation and remain statistically significant.
Finally, the by-industry distribution of sample firm-year observations (Table 2B)
shows that family firms are absent from the power, gas, and water production and supply
industry (industry code D). To control for potential industry effects, we follow Anderson et al.
(2003) and exclude this industry (34 firm-year observations) from our sample. Our main
findings remain valid with this new sample, which contains 3286 firm-year observations
(with all industries containing both family and nonfamily firms).

6. Summary and Conclusion
The existing literature provides inconclusive empirical evidence on the impact of
family control on firms’ cost of debt. Moreover, several studies that examine such an impact
from a perspective of country-level institutions (e.g., Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010; Ellul et al.,
2007) seem to generate inconsistent results. Therefore, we posit that the impact of family
control on the cost of debt is affected by certain firm-level factors.
We find that in China, which is characterized by weak external institutions, familycontrolled firms on average pay significantly lower costs of debt relative to non–familycontrolled firms. We also find that controlling families’ negative impact on the firms’ cost of
debt is affected by corporate information opacity. Specifically, the negative impact mainly
exists in relatively less opaque firms; there is no significant difference in the cost of debt
between family and nonfamily firms when corporate opacity is relatively high. Thus, our
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findings complement previous studies that find that the impact of family ownership on the
cost of debt depends on the relative strength of institutions (e.g., Ellul et al., 2007). We
further provide evidence that the moderating effect of corporate opacity on the relationship
between family control and the cost of debt is affected by certain other factors. Specifically,
the cost of debt of family firms is more sensitive to corporate opacity when the controlling
shareholders’ control-ownership wedge is higher, when marketization and property rights are
weaker, and marginally more sensitive when firms are not politically connected.
Our study has important implications for family firms. Like firms in many other
emerging markets, listed firms in China overall rely heavily on debt to finance their growth.
Therefore, identifying factors that influence the impact of family control on the cost of debt is
especially important in helping family firms, not only in China but also in other emerging
markets, discover how they can benefit from lower costs of debt. In addition, families in both
developed and emerging markets commonly control the firms with a relatively small equity
ownership. Our results show that, when corporate information is relatively transparent, family
control continues to be negatively associated with the cost of debt, even with a relatively high
control-ownership wedge. Our findings that the impact of family control on the cost of debt is
more sensitive to corporate opacity when legal protection of property and market
development are relatively weaker indicate that transparent information is even more
valuable to family firms in countries with weak institutions, where, according to Ellul et al.
(2007), family firms are more likely to experience higher costs of debt.
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Appendix Robustness checks using unsinged (absolute value) discretionary accruals as a measure of corporate opacity
Table A1. Family firms and the cost of debt (full sample and sub-sample analyses)

Full sample

Family ownership
Constant and control variables
Year and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

OLS
(1)
-0.884**
[0.426]
Yes
Yes
2220
0.204
12.02***

Dependent variable: Cost of debt
Low-accruals subsample
Firm-fixed effects
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
(2)
(3)
(4)
-1.326*
-1.219***
-0.922**
[0.706]
[0.408]
[0.444]
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
2220
1110
1110
0.414
0.209
0.508
2.89***
6.68***
2.31***

High-accruals subsample
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
(5)
(6)
-0.436
-0.370
[0.615]
[1.520]
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1110
1110
0.221
0.308
11.22***
2.27***

Table A2. Family firms and the cost of debt (full sample with interaction term)

Family ownership
Family ownership*Discretionary accruals
Discretionary accruals
Constant and control variables
Year and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

Dependent variable: Cost of debt
OLS
(1)
-1.246**
[0.601]
6.165**
[2.563]
0.509
[0.395]
Yes
Yes
2220
0.207
11.97***

Firm-fixed effects
(2)
-1.549**
[0.741]
4.492**
[2.083]
0.007
[0.985]
Yes
No
2220
0.415
2.57***
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Table A3. Control-ownership wedge, family firm, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt

Family ownership
Family ownership * Discretionary accruals
Discretionary accruals
Constant and control variables
Year and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

OLS
(1)
-1.289**
[0.636]
2.664**
[1.329]
0.588
[0.481]
Yes
Yes
1196
0.235
18.44***

Dependent variable: Cost of debt
High-wedge subsample
Firm-fixed effects
(2)
-3.256**
[1.609]
9.892**
[4.984]
-0.430
[0.914]
Yes
No
1196
0.540
2.47***

Low-wedge subsample
OLS
(3)
-1.141**
[0.575]
7.199
[5.113]
0.740
[0.585]
Yes
Yes
1024
0.210
30.56***

Firm-fixed effects
(4)
-1.336***
[0.436]
2.429
[12.091]
1.423
[3.035]
Yes
No
1024
0.321
3.46***

Table A4. External institutions, family firms, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt

Family ownership
Family ownership * Discretionary accruals
Discretionary accruals
Constant and control variables
Year and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

Dependent variable: Cost of debt
External factor: Market development
Low-market-development subsample
High-market-development subsample
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
-1.469**
-2.219*
-0.332**
-1.445*
[0.577]
[1.161]
[0.147]
[0.874]
10.737**
7.119**
4.668
1.254
[4.887]
[3.501]
[6.112]
[1.726]
1.759*
0.434
0.312
1.003
[0.906]
[0.834]
[0.873]
[1.262]
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
925
925
948
948
0.215
0.540
0.345
0.634
14.44***
39.94***
6.21***
2.90***

External factor: property protection
Low-property-protection subsample
High-property-protection subsample
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
-1.558**
-2.536***
-0.264**
-1.763*
[0.722]
[0.823]
[0.126]
[0.904]
13.714***
10.127**
7.297
3.630
[5.082]
[5.002]
[6.073]
[6.182]
1.151*
0.160
0.826
0.352
[0.674]
[0.853]
[0.583]
[1.319]
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
933
933
940
940
0.235
0.542
0.311
0.638
14.25***
53.38***
4.88***
2.76***
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Table A5. Political connection, family firms, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt

Family ownership
Family ownership * Discretionary accruals
Discretionary accruals
Constant and control variables
Year and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

Dependent variable: Cost of debt
Non-politically-connected subsample
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
(1)
(2)
-1.622***
-1.870**
[0.631]
[0.766]
9.277**
6.190*
[4.045]
[3.403]
0.384
0.753
[0.443]
[1.539]
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1430
1430
0.219
0.356
9.80***
2.43***

OLS
(3)
-0.970**
[0.491]
1.863
[2.003]
0.913
[0.828]
Yes
Yes
790
0.239
5.32***

Politically-connected subsample
Firm-fixed effects
(4)
-0.520
[0.346]
2.740
[2.268]
0.421
[0.720]
Yes
No
790
0.652
2.60***

Notes: Tables in this appendix present regression results of the impact of family firms on the cost of debt and on the role of discretionary accruals on the relationship between family firms
and the cost of debt. The regression model for Table A1 is as follows:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖 𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡 + Σ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑗 + Σ 𝛽𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡 + Σ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖 𝑡
,
,
,

And the regression model for Tables A2 to A5 is as follows:

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖 𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖 𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖 𝑡
,
,
,
,
,
+Σ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑗 + Σ 𝛽𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡 + Σ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖 𝑡
,

Discretionary accruals are calculated using modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995). Higher (absolute) values of discretionary accruals indicate greater corporate opacity. All other variables
are defined in Table 1. The constant term and control variables are included in all regressions but their coefficients are not reported. Standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering are
reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

42

References
Achleitner, A., Gunther, N., Kaserer, C., & Siciliano, G. (2014). Real earnings management
and accrual-based earnings management in family firm. European Accounting Review, 23,
431–461.
Adams, R. B., Almeida, H., & Ferreira, D. (2009). Understanding the relationship between
founder-CEOs and firm performance. Journal of Empirical Finance, 16, 136–150.
Anderson, R., Duru, A., & Reeb, D. (2009). Founders, heirs, and corporate opacity in the
United States. Journal of Financial Economics, 92, 205–222.
Anderson, R., Mansi, S., & Reeb, D. (2003). Founding family ownership and the agency cost
of debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 68, 263–285.
Angrist, J. D., & Pischke, J. (2009). Most harmless econometrics: An empiricist’s companion.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Armstrong, C. S., Guay, W. R., & Weber, J. P. (2010). The role of information and financial
reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting. Journal of Accounting and
Economics, 50, 179–234.
Bekaert, G., Harvey, C. R., & Lundblad, C. (2007). Liquidity and expected returns: Lessons
from emerging markets. Review of Financial Studies, 20, 1783–1831.
Boubakri, N., & Ghouma, H. (2010). Control / ownership structure, creditor rights protection,
and the cost of debt financing: International evidence. Journal of Banking and Finance, 34,
2481–2499.
Burkart, M., Panunzi, F., & Shleifer, A. (2003). Family firms. Journal of Finance, 58, 2167–
2202.
Bushman, R. M., & Smith, A. (2001). Financial accounting information and corporate
governance. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 32, 237–351.
Bushman, R., Piotroski, J., & Smith, A. (2004). What determines corporate transparency?
Journal of Accounting Research, 42, 207–252.
Chen, C., Li, Z., Su, X., & Sun, Z. (2011). Rent-seeking incentives, corporate political
connections, and the control structure of private firms: Chinese evidence. Journal of
Corporate Finance, 17, 229–243.
Cheng, Q. (2014). Family firm research—A review. Working paper. Singapore Management
University.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P. H., & Lang, L. H. P. (2002). Disentangling the incentive
and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. Journal of Finance, 57, 2741–2772.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. (2000). The separation of ownership and control in
East Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 81–112.
43

Cliff, M. T., & Denis, D. J. (2004). Do initial public offering firms purchase analyst coverage
with underpricing? Journal of Finance, 59, 2871–2901.
Dechow, P., Sloan R., & Sweeney, A. (1995). Detecting earnings management. The
Accounting Review, 70, 193–225.
Demsetz, H., & Lehn, K. (1985). The structure of corporate ownership. Journal of Political
Economy, 93, 1155–1177.
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2008). The law and
economics of self-dealing. Journal of Financial Economics, 88, 430–465.
Dyck, A., & Zingales, L. (2004). Private benefits of control: An international comparison.
Journal of Finance, 59, 537–600.
Ellis, K. (2006). Who trades IPOs? A close look at the first days of trading. Journal of
Financial Economics, 79, 339–363.
Ellul, A., Guntay, L., & Lel, U. (2007). External governance and debt agency costs of family
firms. Federal Reserve International Finance Discussion Paper No. 908.
Faccio, M., & Lang, L. H. P. (2002). The ultimate ownership of Western European
corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 65, 365–395.
Faccio, M., Masulis, R., & McConnell, J. (2006). Political connections and corporate bailouts.
Journal of Finance, 61, 2597–2635.
Fahlenbrach, R. (2009). Founder–CEOs, investment decisions, and stock market performance.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 44, 439–466.
Fan, G., Wang, X., & Zhu, H. (2011). In NERI index of marketization of China’s provinces
2011 report. Economic Science Press, Beijing (in Chinese).
Fan, J., & Wong, T. J. (2002). Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of
accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Finance, 33, 401–425.
Fan, J., Wong, T. J., & Zhang, T. (2007). Politically-connected CEOs, corporate governance
and post-IPO performance of China’s partially privatized firms. Journal of Financial
Economics, 84, 330–357.
Fan, J., Wong, T. J., & Zhang, T. (2012). Founder succession and accounting properties.
Contemporary Accounting Research, 29, 283–311.
Francis, J., Lafond, R., Olsson, P., & Schipper, K. (2004). Costs of equity and earnings
attributes. The Accounting Review, 79, 967–1010.
Francis, J., Lafond, R., Olsson, P., & Schipper, K. (2005a). The market pricing of accrual
quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39, 295–327.

44

Francis, J., Schipper, K., & Vincent, L. (2005b). Earnings and dividends informativeness
when cash flow rights are separated from voting rights. Journal of Accounting and
Economics, 39, 329–360.
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs
and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360.
Johnson, S., La Porta, R., Shleifer, A., & Lopez-de-Silanes, F. (2000). Tunneling. American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 90, 22–27.
Kelejian, H. H. (1971). Two-stage least squares and econometric systems linear in parameters
but nonlinear in the endogenous variables. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 66,
373–374.
Kim, J.B., Simunic, D. A., Stein, M. T., & Yi, C. H. (2011). Voluntary audits and the cost of
debt capital for privately held firms: Korean evidence. Contemporary Accounting Research,
28, 585–615.
Kim, E.H., & Lu, Y. (2011). CEO ownership, external governance, and risk-taking. Journal
of Financial Economics, 102, 272–292.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2000). Investor protection and
corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58, 3–27.
Lang, M., Lins, K., & Miller, D. (2004). Concentrated control, analyst following, and
valuation: Do analysts matter most when investors are protected least? Journal of Accounting
Research, 42, 589–623.
Lang, M., & Lundholm, R. (1993). Cross-sectional determinants of analyst ratings of
corporate disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research, 31, 246–271.
Lesmond, D., Ogden, J., & Trzcinka, C. (1999). A new estimate of transaction costs. Review
of Financial Studies, 12, 1113–1141.
Leuz, C., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. (2003). Earnings management and investor protection:
An international comparison. Journal of Financial Economics, 69, 505–527.
Leuz, C., & Oberholzer-Gee, F. (2006). Political relationships, global financing, and
corporate transparency: Evidence from Indonesia. Journal of Financial Economics, 81, 411–
439.
Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. (2000). The economic consequences of increased disclosure.
Journal of Accounting Research, 38, 91–124.
Li, H., Meng, L., & Zhang, J. (2006). Why do entrepreneurs entre politics? Evidence from
China. Economic Inquiry, 44, 559–578.
Lin, C., Ma, Y., Malatesta, P., & Xuan, Y. (2011). Ownership structure and the cost of
corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 100, 1–23.

45

Lins, K., Volpin, P., & Wagner, H. (2013). Does family control matter? International
evidence from the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Review of Financial Studies, 26, 2583–2619.
Ma, L., Ma, S., & Tian, G. (2013). Political connection, founder managers, and their impact
on tunneling in China’s listed firms. Pacific Basin Finance Journal, 24, 312–339.
Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when
firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13, 187–
221.
Nikolaev, V., & van Lent, L. (2005). The endogeneity bias in the relation between cost-ofdebt capital and corporate disclosure policy. European Accounting Review, 14, 677–724.
Petersen, M. A., & Rajan, R. G. (1994). The benefits of lending relationships: Evidence from
small business data. Journal of Finance, 49, 3–37.
Pittman, J. A., & Fortin, S. (2004). Auditor choice and the cost of debt capital for newly
public firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 37, 113–136.
Prencipe, A., Bar-Yosef, S., & Dekker, H. C. (2014). Accounting research in family firms:
Theoretical and empirical challenges. European Accounting Review, 23, 361–385.
Qi, Y., Roth, L., & Wald, J. K. (2010). Political rights and the cost of debt. Journal of
Financial Economics, 95, 202–226.
Rajan, R., & Servaes, H. (1997). Analyst following of initial public offerings. Journal of
Finance, 52, 507–529.
Sanchez-Ballesta, J. P., & Garcia-Meca, E. (2011). Ownership structure and the cost of debt.
European Accounting Review, 20, 389–416.
Sengupta, P. (1998). Corporate disclosure quality and the cost of debt. The Accounting
Review, 73, 459–474.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R.W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance
52, 737–783.
Smith, C. W., & Warner, J. (1979). On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants.
Journal of Financial Economics, 7, 117–161.
Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. (2006). How do family ownership, control, and management
affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics, 80, 385–417.
Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. (2009). How are U.S. family firms controlled? Review of
Financial Studies, 22, 3047–3091.
Wang, D. (2006). Founding family ownership and earnings quality. Journal of Accounting
Research, 44, 619–656.

46

Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1986). In Positive accounting theory. Prentice-Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, NJ.
World Bank. (2006). China governance, investment climate, and harmonious society:
Competitiveness enhancements for 120 cities in China. World Bank Report No. 37759-CN.

47

Table 1. Descriptions of main variables used in the analyses
Variable
Dependent variables:
Cost of debt
Key independent variables:
Family ownership
Family dummy
Opacity index
Trading volume
Analyst coverage
Zero-return days
Stock return volatility
Borrowing firm characteristics:
Firm size
PPE
Debt ratio
Current ratio
Cash flow
ROA
Sales growth
Negative equity
Board size
Outside directors
Wedge
Political connection
Institutional variables:
Market development
Property protection
Instrumental variables
Personal name
Multiple founders

Description
Interest expense for the year divided by the average of short-term and long-term debt during the year
The fractional equity ownership by the family if a firm is classified as a family firm; zero for all nonfamily firms
A dummy variable that equals 1 if both of the conditions are met: (1) the founder and his family members hold at least 20% of the firm’s control rights; and (2) the
founding family (all family members combined) is the ultimate largest shareholder.
An opacity index constructed to measure corporate information opacity. The opacity index ranks four components, trading volume, analyst coverage, zero-return trading
days, and stock return volatility in deciles (from 0 to 9) and divides the sum of the four components by 36, resulting in an opacity index between 0 and 0.9. A higher value
of opacity index indicates that a firm’s information is more opaque
Average daily number of shares traded during the year divided by the average number of total shares outstanding during the year
The number of equity analysts following each firm
Proportion of zero daily returns over the number of trading days during the year
Standard deviation of daily stock returns (dividend-adjusted) during the year
The natural logarithm of total assets
Net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets
The sum of short-term and long-term debt divided by total assets
Current assets divided by current liabilities
Operating cash flow divided by total assets
Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets
Total sales revenues in the current year minus total sales revenues in last year divided by total sales revenues in the last year
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm reports negative equity; zero otherwise
The natural logarithm of the total number of directors on the board
The number of outside directors divided by total number of board directors
The difference between the controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash flow rights
A dummy variable that equals 1 if either the Chairman or the CEO is politically connected; zero otherwise
An index that measures the overall level of marketization in the province in which a firm is headquartered. Higher index values indicate higher level of marketization.
An index that measures the level of legal protection of property rights in the province in which a firm is headquartered. Higher index values indicate higher level of legal
protection.
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the name of the firm at the time of IPO contains (part of) personal name(s) related to the founder(s)
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has more than one founder
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Table 2. Distribution of firm-year observations
Panel A. Number and percentage of firm-year observations by year
Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
Total

All firms
334
394
423
456
515
577
621
3320

Family firms
75
103
105
130
186
228
265
1092

Nonfamily firms
259
291
318
326
329
349
356
2228

Percentage of family firms (%)
22.5
26.1
24.8
28.5
36.1
39.5
42.7
32.9

Panel B. Number and percentage of firm-year observations by industry
Industry code

Industry description

All firms

Family firms

Nonfamily firms

A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
J
K
L
M

Agricultural, forestry, livestock & fishery
Mining
Manufacturing
Power, gas & water production & supply
Construction
Transport & storage
Information technology
Wholesale & retail trade
Real estate
Social services
Communication & cultural industry
Comprehensive
Total

89
24
1963
34
64
33
276
208
316
97
9
207
3320

38
6
736
0
28
9
135
21
69
15
4
31
1092

51
18
1227
34
36
24
141
187
247
82
5
176
2228

Percentage of family
firms (%)
42.7
25.0
37.5
0
43.8
27.3
48.9
10.1
21.8
15.5
44.4
15.0
32.9

Notes: A firm is defined as a family firm if both of these two conditions are met: (1) the founder and his family members hold at least 20% of the firm’s control rights; and (2) the founding
family (all family members combined) is the ultimate largest shareholder.
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Table 3. Means, medians, standard deviations and univariate tests of differences in means and medians between family firms and nonfamily firms
All firms
Variables
Dependent variables
Cost of debt (%)
Key independent variables
Family ownership
Family dummy
Opacity index
Other control variables
Total assets (RMB millions)
Firm size
PPE
Debt ratio
Current ratio
Cash flow
Sales growth
ROA
Negative equity
Board size
Outside directors
wedge
No. of firm-year obs.

Family firms

Nonfamily firms
(5)
(6)
Mean
Median

Diff. in means

Diff. in medians

(3) – (5)

(4) – (6)

5.876

-0.577***

-0.674***

0
0
0.446

0
0
0.450

0.318***
1.000***
-0.019***

0.293***
1.000***
-0.025***

2144
20.903
0.261
0.665
1.647
0.045
0.289
0.030
0.068
2.149
0.361
0.099

1204
20.906
0.236
0.535
1.155
0.044
0.105
0.023
0
2.197
0.333
0.087

600***
0.342***
-0.021***
-0.214***
0.458***
0.003
-0.012
-0.006*
-0.061***
-0.007
0.005***
-0.025***

278***
0.209***
-0.012**
-0.088***
0.343***
0.007
0.090
-0.001
0
0
0
-0.047***

(1)
Mean

(2)
Median

(3)
Mean

(4)
Median

5.705

5.662

5.318

5.202

5.895

0.105
0.329
0.440

0
0
0.450

0.318
1
0.427

0.293
1
0.425

2342
21.012
0.254
0.595
1.798
0.046
0.285
0.028
0.048
2.147
0.363
0.091

1302
20.987
0.232
0.502
1.261
0.046
0.137
0.023
0
2.197
0.333
0.074

2744
21.245
0.240
0.451
2.105
0.048
0.277
0.024
0.007
2.142
0.366
0.074

1482
21.115
0.224
0.447
1.498
0.051
0.195
0.022
0
2.197
0.333
0.040

3320

1092

2228

Notes: Variables include cost of debt, corporate information opacity index, and borrowing firm characteristics. All variables are defined in Table 1. Significances are based on p-values using
the two-tailed t-test for mean (Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test for median). *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4. Family firms and the cost of debt
OLS
(1)
0.682
[2.250]
-1.480***
[0.465]

Constant
Family ownership

Dependent variable: Cost of debt
Firm-fixed effects
(2)
2.392
[2.809]
-1.012**
[0.507]

OLS
(3)
0.772
[2.265]

Firm-fixed effects
(4)
2.240
[2.812]
-0.142**
[0.071]
-0.093
[0.113]
2.709***
[0.652]
0.049**
[0.019]
-0.151
[0.107]
0.254
[0.506]
-0.023
[0.041]
0.228
[0.323]
-0.903**
[0.423]
-1.126
[1.099]
No
No
3320
0.612
3.33***

Year dummies
Industry dummies
No. of obs.

-0.146*
[0.088]
3.087***
[0.597]
0.052**
[0.024]
-0.529***
[0.184]
-2.538***
[0.601]
-0.031
[0.056]
0.738*
[0.380]
-0.294
[0.334]
0.342
[1.166]
Yes
Yes
3320

-0.090
[0.113]
2.686***
[0.654]
0.049***
[0.019]
-0.151
[0.107]
0.234
[0.506]
-0.022
[0.041]
0.225
[0.323]
-0.901**
[0.423]
-1.162
[1.095]
No
No
3320

-0.377***
[0.144]
-0.144
[0.089]
3.148***
[0.603]
0.052**
[0.024]
-0.530***
[0.183]
-2.546***
[0.603]
-0.034
[0.056]
0.761**
[0.383]
-0.294
[0.335]
0.033
[1.158]
Yes
Yes
3320

Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

0.333
18.10***

0.613
3.70***

0.331
17.75***

Family dummy
Log assets
PPE
Debt ratio
Current ratio
Cash flow
Sales growth
Negative equity
Board size
Outside directors

Notes: This table reports regression results of cost of debt on family firms. The regression model is as follows:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖 𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡 ( 𝑜𝑜 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖 𝑡 ) + Σ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑗 + Σ 𝛽𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡 + Σ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖 𝑡
,
,
,
,

Columns 1 and 3 use ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation and columns 2 and 4 use firm-fixed estimation. All variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors corrected for firm-level
clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 5. Family firms and the cost of debt (subsample analyses)
Dependent variable: Cost of Debt
Low-opacity subsample

Family ownership
Constant and control variables
Year and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

OLS
(1)
-2.061***
[0.546]
Yes
Yes
1779
0.343
14.95***

High-opacity subsample
Firm-fixed effects
(2)
-1.037**
[0.523]
Yes
No
1779
0.734
2.95***

OLS
(3)
-0.493
[0.531]
Yes
Yes
1541
0.368
14.48***

Firm-fixed effects
(4)
-0.745
[1.720]
Yes
No
1541
0.546
2.63***

Notes: This table reports regression results of cost of debt on family firms, for the low-opacity subsample (columns 1 and 2) and high-opacity subsample (columns 3 to 4). The regression
model is as follows:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖 𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡 + Σ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑗 + Σ 𝛽𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡 + Σ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖 𝑡
,
,
,

Columns 1 and 3 use OLS estimation and columns 2 and 4 use firm-fixed estimation. Low-opacity firms are defined as those for which the opacity index is below the sample median. Highopacity firms are defined as those for which the opacity index is above the sample median. All variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering are reported
in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 6. Family firms, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt

Family ownership
Family ownership * Opacity index
Opacity index
Constant and control variables
Year and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

OLS
(1)
-3.182***
[1.011]
4.527**
[2.012]
1.091**
[0.479]
Yes
Yes
3320
0.339
17.54***

Dependent variable: Cost of Debt

Firm-fixed effects
(2)
-1.634***
[0.706]
0.763**
[0.351]
2.082**
[0.929]
Yes
No
3320
0.615
3.79***

Notes: This table presents regression results of cost of debt on family firms and on the interaction between family firms and corporate opacity. The regression model is as follows:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖 𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡
,
,
,
,
,
+Σ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑗 + Σ 𝛽𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡 + Σ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖 𝑡
,

Column 1 uses OLS estimation and column 2 uses firm-fixed estimation. Standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 7. Family firms, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt (instrumental variables estimations)

Family ownership
Family ownership * Opacity index
Opacity index
Log Assets
PPE
Debt ratio
Current ratio
Cash flow
Sales growth
Negative equity
Board size
Outside directors
Year and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

OLS
(1)
-6.091***
[2.311]
8.070***
[2.225]
1.593***
[0.418]
-0.208**
[0.096]
2.925***
[0.592]
0.053**
[0.024]
-0.514***
[0.186]
-2.287***
[0.589]
-0.037
[0.057]
0.733*
[0.395]
-0.244
[0.337]
1.117
[1.211]
Yes
3320
0.334
18.21***

Dependent variable: Cost of Debt

Firm-fixed effects
(2)
-9.081***
[1.819]
8.542***
[2.841]
0.723**
[0.302]
-0.018
[0.113]
2.686***
[0.656]
0.042**
[0.020]
-0.150
[0.107]
-0.051
[0.512]
-0.010
[0.042]
0.092
[0.329]
-0.726*
[0.418]
-1.804*
[1.006]
No
3320
0.615
6.75***

Notes: This table presents instrumental variable regressions of cost of debt on family firms and on the interaction between family firms and corporate opacity. Column 1 uses OLS estimation
and column 3 uses firm-fixed estimation. Both the stand-alone Family ownership and the interaction term Family ownership*Opacity index are instrumented. The IVs in the first stage are
Personal name, Personal name*Opacity index, Multiple founders, and Multiple founders*Opacity index. Personal name is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the name of the firm at the time of
IPO contains a personal name related to the founder(s). Multiple founders is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has more than one founder, i.e., founders from different families. All
other variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Table 8. Control-ownership wedge, family firm, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt
Dependent variable: Cost of Debt
High-wedge subsample

Family ownership
Family ownership * Opacity index
Opacity index
Constant and control variables
Year and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

OLS
(1)
-3.821***
[1.380]
4.183***
[1.484]
1.520***
[0.409]
Yes
Yes
1660
0.297
13.10***

Low-wedge subsample
Firm-fixed effects
(2)
-3.488**
[1.695]
5.964***
[1.773]
1.489**
[0.660]
Yes
No
1660
0.670
3.92***

OLS
(3)
-2.425**
[1.134]
3.354
[2.641]
0.804*
[0.431]
Yes
Yes
1660
0.359
10.57***

Firm-fixed effects
(4)
-1.488**
[0.696]
-1.197
[2.305]
0.466
[0.423]
Yes
No
1660
0.577
2.41***

Notes: This table presents regression results of cost of debt on family firms and on the interaction between family firms and corporate opacity, for the high-wedge subsample and low-wedge
subsample. The regression model is as follows:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖 𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡
,
,
,
,
,
+Σ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑗 + Σ 𝛽𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡 + Σ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖 𝑡
,

Columns 1 and 3 use OLS estimation and columns 2 and 4 use firm-fixed estimation. Wedge is defined as the difference between the ultimate controlling shareholder’s control rights and cash
flow rights. High-wedge firms are defined as those for which the control-ownership wedge is above the sample median. Low-wedge firms are defined as those for which the wedge is below
the sample median. All other variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 9. External institutions, family firms, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt
Panel A.

Family ownership
Family ownership * Opacity index
Opacity index
Constant and control variables
Year and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

Low-market-development subsample
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
(1)
(2)
-3.604***
-4.803***
[1.330]
[1.536]
8.745**
10.084***
[4.040]
[3.653]
1.190**
1.448**
[0.558]
[0.660]
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1346
1346
0.238
0.617
9.88***
21.65***

High-market-development subsample
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
(3)
(4)
-1.166**
-1.006**
[0.544]
[0.463]
-0.418
-1.746
[1.858]
[2.316]
0.927*
0.411
[0.522]
[0.502]
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1353
1353
0.515
0.751
14.46***
2.24***

Low-property-protection subsample
(1)
(2)
-3.453**
-4.318**
[1.599]
[2.141]
8.258**
9.693***
[3.703]
[2.557]
1.372***
1.441**
[0.534]
[0.692]
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1342
1342
0.253
0.614
11.34***
21.35***

High-property-protection subsample
(3)
(4)
-1.265***
-1.651**
[0.454]
[0.811]
0.091
-1.333
[1.016]
[1.505]
0.845
0.486*
[0.545]
[0.291]
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
1357
1357
0.457
0.753
5.91***
2.55***

Panel B.

Family ownership
Family ownership * Opacity index
Opacity index
Constant and control variables
Year and industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

Notes: This table presents regression results of cost of debt on family firms and on the interaction between family firms and corporate opacity, subject to market development (Panel A) and
property protection (Panel B). The regression model is as follows:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡 𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖 𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡
,
,
,
,
,
+Σ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑗 + Σ 𝛽𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡 + Σ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖 𝑡
,

Columns 1 and 3 use OLS estimation and columns 2 and 4 use firm-fixed estimation. The sample period in this table is 2004–2009, for which the market development index and property
protection index are available. Market development (property protection) is an index that measures the overall level of marketization (property rights protection) of the province in which a

56

firm is headquartered (Fan et al., 2011). Higher index values indicate higher level of marketization (or property protection). High-market-development (High-property-protection) firms are
defined as those headquartered in provinces for which the market development (property protection) index is above the sample median. Low-market-development (Low-property-protection)
firms are defined as those headquartered in provinces for which the market development (property protection) index is below the sample median. All other variables are defined in Table 1.
Standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 10. Political connection, family firms, corporate opacity, and the cost of debt

Family ownership
Family ownership * Opacity index
Opacity index
Constant and control variables
Industry dummies
No. of obs.
Adjusted R-squared
F-stat.

Dependent variable: Cost of Debt
Non-politically-connected subsample
Politically-connected subsample
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
OLS
Firm-fixed effects
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
-4.708***
-1.163**
-1.647***
-1.643**
[1.427]
[0.548]
[0.603]
[0.819]
7.242***
1.847**
1.925
2.498
[2.656]
[0.918]
[2.544]
[2.448]
1.142**
0.796**
0.554
0.935*
[0.470]
[0.383]
[0.556]
[0.530]
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
2099
2099
1221
1221
0.341
0.583
0.371
0.726
12.01***
2.74***
9.85***
3.63***

Notes: This table presents regression results of cost of debt on family firms and on the interaction between family firms and corporate opacity, for politically-connected subsample and nonpolitically-connected subsample. The regression model is as follows:
𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠 𝑜𝑜 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖 𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑡
,
,
,
,
,
+Σ 𝛽𝑗𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑗 + Σ 𝛽𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑡 + Σ 𝛽𝑘𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖 𝑡
,

Columns 1 and 3 use OLS estimation and columns 2 and 4 use firm-fixed estimation. Political connection is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the CEO of the firm is politically connected. All
other variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors corrected for firm-level clustering are reported in brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
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